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Abstract—Observation of terrestrial GNSS interference (jam-
ming and spoofing) from low-earth orbit (LEO) is a uniquely
effective technique for characterizing the scope, strength, and
structure of interference and for estimating transmitter locations.
Such details are useful for situational awareness, interference
deterrence, and for developing interference-hardened GNSS re-
ceivers. This paper explores the performance of LEO interference
monitoring and presents the results of a three-year study of
global interference, with emphasis on a particularly powerful
interference source active in Syria since 2017.
Index Terms—GNSS interference; spoofing; emitter localiza-
tion; Doppler positioning
I. INTRODUCTION
Terrestrial GNSS interference activity has grown more
widespread and sophisticated over recent years. Conspicuous
GNSS jamming or spoofing has occurred, or is ongoing,
at urban and coastal sites around the globe [1]–[4]. Given
the dependence of critical infrastructure and safety-of-life
systems on GNSS [5]–[8], there is great interest in detecting,
characterizing, and localizing sources of interference.
Space-based observation of terrestrial GNSS interference is
attractive for several reasons. Most obviously, it offers world-
wide coverage: moderately-powerful terrestrial interference
sources anywhere on the globe can be detected by low-
earth orbit (LEO) satellites multiple times per day, making
it possible to maintain a common operating picture of world-
wide GNSS interference. Moreover, LEO satellites’ stand-off
distance from terrestrial interference sources often permits
tracking authentic GNSS signals despite the interference,
allowing precise estimation of a LEO receiver’s position,
velocity, and time, which, in turn, supports estimation of
interference transmitter locations. A single LEO-based sensor
is sufficient to characterize the strength, spectral properties,
structural content, and even the location of terrestrial interfer-
ence sources, provided a Doppler time history can be extracted
from a carrier component of the interference signal. For signals
from which no carrier can be isolated, multiple synchro-
nized LEO-based sensors can employ time- and frequency-
difference-of-arrival (TDOA and FDOA) techniques to infer
the source’s location [9], [10].
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This paper presents the results of a three-year study of
terrestrial GNSS interference as observed through a software-
defined GNSS receiver operating since February 2017 on
the International Space Station (ISS). The FOTON receiver,
developed by The University of Texas at Austin (UT) and
Cornell University, is part of a larger science experiment called
GPS Radio Occultation and Ultraviolet PhotometryColocated
(GROUP-C), an unclassified experiment aboard the ISS that is
part of the Space Test ProgramHouston Payload 5 (STP-H5)
payload. Serendipitous observations of GNSS interference in
the occultation data are an important early result of GROUP-
C’s scientific objective to characterize GPS signals in the LEO
environment. This paper discusses the interference signals
detected, their effects, and interference mitigation strategies
for receivers deployed in LEO and terrestrial environments.
The FOTON receiver is a science-grade spaceborne dual-
frequency (GPS L1 and L2) GNSS receiver [11]. Three levels
of FOTON data are available for interference analysis: (1)
raw 5.7 Msps intermediate frequency (IF) samples output by
the FOTON front-end’s analog-to-digital converter, (2) 100-Hz
data-modulation-wiped complex correlation products, and (3)
1-Hz standard GNSS observables.
Although spaceborne GNSS sensors have been used for
remote sensing via radio occultation [12] and reflectometry
[13], no prior public literature explores their use for monitoring
terrestrial GNSS interference, despite increasing concern over
such interference [8], [14]–[16]. Moreover, the recent survey
of GNSS interference localization techniques in [17] makes no
mention of single-receiver Doppler-based localization, whether
space-based or not. General TDOA and FDOA interference
localization has been extensively studied [10], [18]–[21], and
such techniques have been applied for terrestrial interference
localization from geostationary orbit [22]–[24]. Application
of T/FDOA for localization from LEO can be viewed as
an extension of such demonstrations enabling localization of
much weaker signals. Interference localization using a single
satellite has been explored in [25], but only simulation results
are presented, and these unrealistically assume perfect-tone
interference with a known and constant frequency.
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, it
introduces the concept and presents an analysis of expected
performance for terrestrial GNSS interference monitoring from
LEO. Second, it presents the results of a three-year study
of global GNSS interference, with emphasis on a powerful
interference source active in Syria since 2017. Via Doppler
positioning using the FOTON instrument on the ISS, the
Syrian transmitter is located to within less than 1 km, an
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2achievement without precedent in the open literature. Third,
this paper explores the implications of interference of the type
generated by the Syrian source for GNSS receiver operation
and design.
A preliminary version of this paper was published in [26].
The current version extends the analysis period to June 2020,
offers a more detailed analysis of localization accuracy, and
includes a new section exploring implications for GNSS
receivers.
II. LEO INTERFERENCE MONITORING PERFORMANCE
This section explores the potential performance of LEO-
based GNSS interference monitoring in terms of sensitivity,
visit interval, and source location accuracy.
A. Sensitivity
Detection of GNSS interference can be broadly classified
as operating at the pre- or post-correlation stage within a
GNSS receiver [27]. Pre-correlation detection is much less
sensitive, but works for all signals with power falling in the
band of interest. Post-correlation detection can only be applied
to structured interference with a known waveform, but due to
processing gain, is much more sensitive. What follows is a
sensitivity analysis of three detection techniques, the first two
of which operate at the pre-correlation stage whereas the third
operates at the post-correlation stage.
1) Detection via C/N0 Monitoring: A simple and effective
pre-correlation interference detection test can be formulated
solely from the standard carrier-to-noise ratio observable,
C/N0, produced by a GNSS receiver. In the presence of in-
terference, C/N0 actually measures the carrier-to-interference-
and-noise ratio, CINR. Let C be the received authentic signal
power for a particular satellite-and-signal combination [e.g.,
the GPS L1 C/A signal corresponding to pseudo-random
number (PRN) code 4], N0 be the (approximately flat) receiver
thermal noise power density near the frequency band of inter-
est, and I0 be the spectrally-flat-equivalent interference noise
power density, whose relationship with the actual interference
power spectrum is described in [16]. Then CINR is defined as
CINR , C
N0 + I0
(1)
When compensated for satellite- and receiver-side antenna
gain patterns and for spreading loss along the satellite-to-
receiver path, and absent signal blockage, strong scintillation,
and “flex-power” satellite power adjustments, CINR variations
are primarily driven by multipath, which is characterized by
a log-normal distribution [15]. Let z be a vector of CINR
measurements expressed in dB for a particular frequency band,
with predictable variations due to antenna gain pattern and
spreading loss removed. A hypothesis test for interference can
be formulated in terms of the common decrease in the elements
of z due to an increase in I0. In particular, the distribution of
z under the null (H0) and alternate (H1) hypotheses may be
modeled as
H0 : z ∼ N (µ, P ) (2a)
H1 : z ∼ N (µ− δ1, P ) (2b)
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Fig. 1: Detection probability for the test in (3) as a function
of d for three different values of false alarm probability.
where µ ∈ Rnz , P ∈ Rnz×nz , 1 denotes an all-ones column
vector of the same length as µ, and δ > 0 is the amount in
dB by which all CINR values drop due to interference under
H1.
The model in (2) conservatively assumes that z’s covariance
matrix, P , is identical for H0 and H1. In practice, although
the receiver’s multipath environment remains unchanged from
H0 to H1, interference sources can cause time variations in I0
that inflate P in the positive definite sense. But because the
magnitude of increase in P is impossible to know a priori,
the less-sensitive model presented above is assumed.
The model in (2) is a special case of the general Gaussian
problem for which the likelihood ratio test can be reduced to
[28]
l(z) = 1TP−1z
H0
≷
H1
ν (3)
where l(z) is the test’s (sufficient) detection statistic. This test
is optimal despite δ being unknown a priori because l(z) is
independent of δ (i.e., the test is uniformly most powerful with
respect to δ). Note that P may not be diagonal because the
elements of z may be correlated through dependence on the
spacecraft attitude or because z may contain multiple elements
for the same satellite-signal pair taken over a sliding window
of time.
As a linear transformation of a Gaussian vector, l(z) is itself
Gaussian. Hence, the performance of the test in (3) can be
completely characterized by the normalized distance between
the means of l(z) under H0 and H1:
d , E [l|H0]− E [l|H1]√
Var(l|H0)
= δ
√
1TP−11 (4)
Fig. 1 shows how the performance improves with increasing
d.
If the CINR measurements in z are taken at a single epoch
of time, and if the effect of multipath on each measurement is
only weakly coupled through the spacecraft attitude, then P
may be modeled as diagonal. In the simplest case, P = σ2zI
and d reduces to
d = δ
√
nz/σz (5)
For the FOTON receiver on the ISS, the ISS’s extended
shape and large solar panels create an unfavorable multipath
environment, resulting in a relatively high σz ≈ 1.5 dB. More
compact LEO satellites such as the main sounding rocket
payload in [11] enjoy σz < 1 dB.
3Approximate LEO interference detection sensitivity in the
L1 GNSS band using only CINR measurements can be cal-
culated by assuming σz = 1 dB and nz = 15, which are
reasonable parameters for a single-epoch test, a horizontally-
oriented hemispherical-gain antenna, and full constellations of
GPS, Galileo, and BDS III satellites. From (5) and Fig. 1, a
drop in CINR of δ > 1.4 dB is required at PF = 10−5 to
yield PD > 0.9. Conservatively assuming that the interference
power is spread evenly across the 4-MHz bandwidth covering
the most-widely-used civil L1 GNSS signals, then I0 = PI−66
dBW/Hz, where PI is the received interference power in dBW.
Assuming N0 = −204 dBW/Hz, a CINR drop by δ = 1.4
dB implies PI = −142 dBW. Denote spreading loss by L
dB, receiver antenna gain by Gr dB, and interference source
effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP) by PEIRP dBW.
Then
PEIRP = PI −Gr + L (6)
Spreading loss at L1 from the surface along the shortest
distance to a typical LEO altitude of 400 km is L = 148.5
dB. Then, supposing Gr = 3 dB, the minimum EIRP of an in-
terference source detectable solely from CINR measurements
with PF ≤ 10−5 and PD > 0.9 is approximately PEIRP = 3.5
dBW.
2) Detection via Received Power Monitoring: Received
power monitoring for interference detection is in principle
no more sensitive than CINR monitoring, but avoids the
requirement to assemble z only from authentic GNSS signals,
which can be difficult under spoofing interference. In fact,
received power monitoring requires no tracking of signals at
all.
For systems with multi-bit-quantized sampling, total re-
ceived power PT can be estimated from the dynamic gain
setting of an automatic gain control (AGC) unit in the front-
end digitizer, or directly from the pre-correlation samples in
a constant-gain system, assuming sufficient dynamic range to
avoid quantization saturation. The hypothesis test model is
identical to (2) with z = PT ∈ R and nz = 1. Its performance
is governed by (5), with δ < 0 re-defined as the negative of
the increase in PT under H1, and σ2z as the variance of the
unmodelable components of PT.
A low-multipath LEO satellite will exhibit similar σz to that
of a static terrestrial GNSS receiver, or approximately 0.25 dB
for a 4-MHz bandwidth [16]. It follows from (5) and Fig. 1
that δ > 1.4 dB satisfies PD > 0.9 with PF = 10−5, and
the remainder of the sensitivity analysis is identical to that
of the foregoing section, yielding an approximate minimum
detectable EIRP of PEIRP = 3.5 dBW.
3) Detection via Signal Acquisition: A potent type of
GNSS interference, called matched-spectrum interference, al-
locates its signal power to match the spectrum of a target
authentic GNSS signal, thus maximizing I0 for a receiver
tracking that signal [16]. When a matched-spectrum interferer
employs a standard GNSS spreading code to achieve the
requisite spectrum-matching, it becomes a matched-code inter-
ferer, which, as will be shown in Section V, can be effective
at denying GNSS service to surrounding receivers on cold-
start. However, matched-code interference is itself vulnerable
to high-sensitivity detection because a distant receiver can
acquire the interference signal just as it does an authentic
GNSS signal. Moreover, a receiver in LEO can despread the
matched-code interference with the known spreading code,
thus extracting a pure carrier tone from whose Doppler time
history the source may be geolocated, as will be detailed later
on.
Consider the sensitivity of matched-code interference de-
tection via signal acquisition from LEO. Denote the LEO
receiver’s C/N0 acquisition threshold by νa dB-Hz. Detection
via acquisition is possible when PI − N0 > νa, with PI
expressed in dBW and N0 in dBW/Hz. For the same values of
N0, Gr, and L assumed in Section II-A1, and conservatively
supposing νa = 30 dB-Hz, the minimum detectable EIRP
of a terrestrial interference source is approximately PEIRP =
−28.5 dBW. Thus, detection of matched-code interference by
signal acquisition is more than 1000 times more sensitive than
detection of unpredictable wideband interference via C/N0
monitoring or received power monitoring.
B. Detection Frequency
A terrestrial interference source is potentially detectable by
LEO satellite monitoring several times a day. Consider a LEO
satellite in a near-ISS orbit: circular, 400-km altitude, and 55◦
inclination. Assuming detection by C/N0 monitoring with the
parameters given in Section II-A1, Fig. 2 shows the average
number of times per day that such a satellite could detect
an interference source, as a function of PEIRP and latitude.
Sources with PEIRP = 3.5 dBW are detectable only when the
satellite’s ground track crosses directly through the source’s
location. As PEIRP rises, detection becomes possible even as
the satellite ground track passes ever further from the source,
increasing detection frequency. This behavior saturates for
PEIRP ≥ 17 dBW, in which case a minimum of 3 detections
occur per day for all latitudes within 75◦ of the equator.
Besides the average detection frequency shown in Fig. 2, it
is instructive to consider the maximum time between detec-
tions for a given PEIRP. Analysis of the ground-track lattice
formed by a LEO satellite with the above orbital parameters
reveals that every 4 days the lattice is sufficiently dense to
guarantee detection of transmitters with PEIRP > 6.1 dBW,
and every 17 days detection of transmitters with PEIRP > 3.65
dBW, for all latitudes within 55◦ of the equator.
C. Geolocation Accuracy
1) Multi-Satellite Geolocation: Time- and frequency-
difference-of-arrival (T/FDOA) techniques have been explored
over the past decades for space-based terrestrial interference
localization. These techniques require at least two time-
synchronized satellites. Reference [24] studied interference
geolocation via EUTELSAT satellites, presenting theoretical
models and real-world campaigns assessing the performance
of combined FDOA and TDOA techniques. Accuracies from
tens to hundreds of km were theorized and demonstrated. The
authors identified satellite ephemeris errors as the dominant
source of location error.
4Fig. 2: Number of times per day that a LEO satellite on a
circular, 55◦ inclination, 400-km altitude orbit could detect a
given terrestrial transmitter by C/N0 monitoring as a function
of the transmitter’s PEIRP and absolute-value latitude, aver-
aged over a 30-day interval.
in [23], TDOA-based interference geolocation was ana-
lyzed for the scenario of three geostationary satellites able
to simultaneously observe the interfering signal. The analysis
showed that location accuracy is improved by increased or-
bital spacing between the observing satellites and by reduced
TDOA measurement error. In this scenario, a transmitter at a
latitude greater than 40◦ can be located to 2 km (1-σ) with
a satellite spacing of 2◦ if the TDOA measurements have a
standard deviation of less than 3.88 ns. Alternatively, a satellite
spacing of 30◦. yields the same location precision for TDOA
measurements of less than 0.832 µs standard deviation.
Joint TDOA/FDOA geolocation from two satellites has been
studied in [18], [19], and particularly for LEO satellites in
[29]. In the latter it was shown that two LEO satellites flying
in parallel formation could provide on the order of 1 km
localization from an orbital altitude of 800 km, with a 50-km
inter-satellite baseline, TDOA measurement errors of 10 ns,
and FDOA measurement errors of 4 Hz for signals centered at
3 GHz. Similar performance could be expected for LEO-based
geolocation of interference sources at GNSS frequencies.
2) Single-Satellite Geolocation: Assuming a carrier can be
extracted from an interference signal, single-satellite-based
transmitter geolocation is possible from Doppler measure-
ments alone [30], [31]. The analysis presented here empha-
sizes the effect of transmitter clock stability on geolocation
accuracy.
Consider a static transmitter emitting a signal at the GPS
L1 frequency as observed by a moving receiver. Let λ be
the signal wavelength in meters, rˆ the unit vector pointing
from the transmitter to receiver, expressed in Earth-centered-
Earth-fixed (ECEF) coordinates, vR the receiver velocity with
respect to the ECEF frame and expressed in ECEF in m/s,
and δt˙R the receiver clock frequency error in s/s, all at the
time of signal receipt. Further, let δt˙T be the transmitter clock
frequency error in s/s at the time of signal transmission, and
w be a zero-mean Gaussian error term that models thermal
noise, ionospheric and tropospheric delay rates, and other
minor effects, in Hz. Then the observed Doppler frequency
in Hz at the receiver can be modeled as
fD = rˆ
TvR/λ− c
[
δt˙R − δt˙T
(
1− δt˙R
)]
/λ+ w (7)
where c is the speed of light in m/s. It is assumed that vR,
δt˙R, and the receiver position are known, e.g., via an onboard
GNSS receiver. The unknown in (7) is transmitter position,
which is embedded in rˆ, and δt˙T. The former is modeled as
an unknown constant and the latter as a random walk process
that evolves as
δ˙tT(tk+1) = δ˙tT(tk) + v(tk) (8)
Here, v(tk) is a discrete-time Gaussian random process with
E [v(tk)] = 0 and E [v(tk)v(tj)] = 2pih−2δtδk,j , ∀k, j, where
h−2 is the first parameter of the standard clock model based
on the fractional frequency error power spectrum, as given in
[32, Chap. 8]; δt = tk+1−tk is the uniform sampling interval;
and δk,j is the Kronecker delta.
It should be noted that a transmitter could introduce any
level of complexity to carrier-phase frequency behavior; e.g.,
frequency modulation, frequency hopping, etc. Such behav-
iors, if not discovered and appropriately modeled, would con-
found geolocation efforts. Here, it is assumed that a nominally-
constant carrier frequency is intended by the transmitter and
that it is operating in steady-state conditions. In fact, it will be
assumed that h−2 is sufficiently small that δ˙tT can be modeled
as constant over a short (e.g., 60-second) data capture interval.
Using the Doppler measurement model from above, a batch
maximum likelihood estimator [33] can be developed to esti-
mate the unknown transmitter position and a constant value for
δ˙tT from a collection of single-pass Doppler measurements.
If Doppler measurements from multiple satellite passes are
available, these can be combined for single-batch estimation
provided that a new value of δ˙tT is estimated for each pass. In
other words, δ˙tT is viewed as constant over the short capture
interval but variable from orbit to orbit.
When δ˙tT is modeled as constant over a capture interval, ac-
tual transmitter clock instability gives rise to Doppler measure-
ment errors. The impact of such errors on geolocation accuracy
was analyzed via Monte Carlo simulation for four levels
of transmitter clock quality, from low-quality temperature-
compensate crystal oscillator (TCXO) to a laboratory-grade
oven-controlled crystal oscillator (OCXO). For each clock
quality level, 1000 Monte Carlo simulations were run. Simu-
lation parameters were based on the real-world interference
capture discussed in the next section: the transmitter loca-
tion was 35.4N latitude, 35.95E longitude, 48m altitude; the
receiver trajectory was taken from the ISS orbit during the
first 60 seconds of the capture interval on day 144 of 2018
(resulting in 441.65 km of total receiver displacement); and
the measurement rate was 20 Hz. First, an error-free Doppler
time history was generated based on this scenario. Then, for
each instance of the Monte Carlo simulation, an independent
realization of a Doppler error random process consistent with
the clock model being analyzed was generated and added to
5the error-free Doppler. Doppler error was modeled as a random
walk process consistent with (8).
TABLE I: Single-pass geolocation accuracy as a function of
transmitter clock frequency stability parameter h−2. The size
of the 95% horizontal geolocation error ellipse, in meters, is
characterized by the semi-major (a) and semi-minor (b) axes.
Clock Quality h−2 a (m) b (m)
Low-quality TCXO 1× 10−20 13027.4 7.8
TCXO 3× 10−21 6712.0 2.0
Low-quality OCXO 3× 10−23 713.4 2.5× 10−2
OCXO 3× 10−25 71.2 3.4× 10−3
Table I shows that transmitter clock frequency stability
has a large effect on single-pass geolocation accuracy. Note
that the error ellipse is highly eccentric. Its semi-minor axis
is oriented in the direction of satellite motion; e.g., if the
satellite is moving west to east then transmitter location will
be best resolved in that direction. It follows that additional
satellite passes provide the most benefit when, relative to
the transmitter location, they are geometrically dissimilar to
previous passes.
III. ANALYSIS OF INTERFERENCE FROM SYRIA
This section presents an in-depth analysis of a particular
interference source active on the east coast of the Mediter-
ranean Sea during the period of this paper’s study, which spans
from March 2017 to June 2020. The analysis illustrates the
techniques that can be applied generally to study terrestrial
GNSS interference sources using signals collected in LEO.
Recording raw IF data in LEO and relaying these to the
ground for processing is an especially flexible approach well
suited to studying new or poorly-understood interference. For
the case presented here, the FOTON receiver captured 1-
minute intervals of raw 5.7-Msps two-bit-quantized IF samples
at the GPS L1 (1575.42 MHz) and the GPS L2 (1227.6 MHz)
frequencies. These data were packaged and downlinked via
NASA’s communications backbone. Ground processing using
the latest version of UT’s software-defined GNSS receiver [34]
enabled analysis and tracking of all radio frequency signals
near GPS L1 and L2.
The following observations are based on particularly strong
interference signals captured on three days in the first half of
2018 along the ground tracks shown in Fig. 3.
A. Overview
Strong interference is present in both the L1 and L2 bands,
but the nature of the interference is markedly different between
the two bands. At L2, the interference is narrowband, whereas
wideband matched-code interference was discovered at L1.
The L1 interference is a composite of individual signals, each
with a carrier (nominally centered at GPS L1) and a unique
GPS L1 C/A pseudo-random number (PRN) code. Signals
corresponding to each PRN code from 1 to 32 have been
detected. When tracked, all such false signals exhibit C/N0
values greater than 40 dB-Hz. No discernible navigation data
are modulated on the false GPS L1 signals, rendering them
Fig. 3: Ground tracks for interference-affected captures on
days 74, 144, and 151 of 2018. Each capture spans ap-
proximately 70 seconds. The estimated transmitter location is
marked on the west coast of Syria.
ineffective at spoofing. Moreover, the false signals are not
clean simulated GPS L1 C/A signals; they exhibit unexplained
fading and spectral characteristics, as if generated from an
extremely low-quality GNSS signal simulator. No false Galileo
BOC(1,1) signals were detected in the L1 band.
The lack of navigation bit modulation and the coarse nature
of the matched-code interference at L1 suggest that its purpose
is denial of GPS service (jamming) rather than spoofing.
The narrowband interference at L2 also appears intended for
jamming. Why different jamming techniques were used at L1
and L2 is unknown.
Each interference channel is observed to be aligned with
respect to spreading code start time. While some authentic
GPS L1 C/A signals in the data are effectively jammed,
the majority of authentic signals are still trackable owing
to sufficient spreading code start time misalignment at the
receiver. Thus, a correct receiver navigation solution can still
be formed despite the interference.
One clue suggests that the transmitter generating the
matched-code interference at L1 is capable of full spoofing.
Close comparison of the spreading code signals reveals small
(between 0.5 and 1 Hz) but constant Doppler offsets between
subsets of PRNs. Apart from these offsets, the post-fit Doppler
time history traces (after solving for the location of the
transmitter and removing the effects of the ISS motion) exhibit
a high degree of mutual correlation. Thus it appears that
the transmitted carrier signals can be traced to a common
clock, but have the potential for an independently-controlled
carrier frequency. This suggests a transmitting device that
can generate more realistic spoofing than the matched-code
interference captured.
B. Power Spectral Characteristics
Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the captured signals’ spectral char-
acteristics. The spectra of narrowband interference near L2
are simple and remain similar across all three days, but the
wideband interference at L1 is more complex and variable.
It is clear from the left column of Fig. 4 that the matched-
code interference is cluttered by other components. Were it
6L1: Day 074 L2: Day 074
L1: Day 144 L2: Day 144
L1: Day 151 L2: Day 151
L1: Nominal L2: Nominal
Fig. 4: Power spectra centered near the GPS L1 (left column) and L2 (right column) frequencies from interference-affected
data captured on days 74, 144, and 151 of 2018 (top three rows), and from nominal data captured on day 158 of 2018 (bottom
row). The frequency span is approximately 3 MHz wide, scaled linearly with 0.5 MHz divisions. All ordinate axes are in dB
and scaled equivalently for ease of comparison. Spectra are estimated by Welch’s method [35] from 1-second data intervals
with a 5.6-kHz frequency resolution.
generated by a high-quality signal simulator, L1 interference
would tend to be smooth like the authentic signals underlying
the spectrum shown in the lower left panel. Instead, it appears
to be a strange amalgam of components. Fig. 5 reveals that the
rounded prominence in the L1: Day 144 panel exhibits oscilla-
tory behavior with a 5-second period. Whether such variations
are deliberate or are caused by transmitter idiosyncrasies is
unknown.
C. Baseband Signal Characteristics
Fig. 6 shows time histories of 10-ms-accumulated complex
correlation products from both the false (top panel) and
authentic (bottom two panels) GPS L1 C/A signals present
in the captured L1 band. The false signal’s empirical C/N0
value is 42.5 dB-Hz on average, but the signal is highly
irregular, manifesting both gradual and sudden fading. The
gradual fading may be a result of scintillation as the signal
passes upward through the lower ionosphere [36], but the
sudden fading, highlighted in the inset of the top panel, is
unnatural and likely occurs at the transmitter.
7Fig. 5: Power spectra near L1 for the day 144 capture showing
maximum (top) and minimum (bottom) phases of the wax-
ing and waning wideband (∼ 0.25MHz) central interference
prominence. The prominence oscillates with a period of ap-
proximately 5 seconds. The L1: Day 144 plot in Fig. 4 catches
the prominence waning two seconds after the maximum shown
in the top plot above.
D. Source Geolocation
The presence of a trackable carrier signal after despreading
(cf. top panel of Fig. 6) raised the possibility of geolocating the
interference source as described in Section II-C2. A receiver
navigation solution was first estimated on days 74, 144, and
151 of 2018 using an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) drawing
in pseudorange and Doppler measurements extracted from the
authentic GPS L1 C/A, GPS L2C, and Galileo E1 signals.
Propagation of the receiver state estimate between measure-
ment updates was based on a nearly-constant acceleration
dynamics model. Time histories of the quantities vR, δt˙R, and
the receiver position component of rˆ were then extracted from
the EKF’s state estimate and treated as known for purposes of
source geolocation. A batch estimator for interference source
position and clock frequency bias was formulated as described
in Section II-C2. It was assumed that the interference source
observed on all three days originated from the same transmitter
and that the transmitter was stationary, which allowed multiple
days of Doppler measurements, collected on non-repeating
ground-tracks, to be combined to form a tightly-constrained es-
timate. If these assumptions were false, they could be expected
to manifest in post-fit measurement residuals. Consistent with
the assumption of a stationary transmitter, transmitter altitude
was assumed to be near ground-level and was included as a
pseudo-measurement.
A constant transmitter clock frequency error δt˙T was as-
sumed during each capture, but a new value of δt˙T was esti-
mated for each capture. Comparing estimates of δt˙T between
captures revealed a transmitter clock fractional frequency
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Fig. 6: In-phase (black) and quadrature (gray) 10-ms accumu-
lation time histories for the strongest false signal from the day
74 capture (top), the strongest authentic signal from the day
74 capture (middle), and the strongest signal from the day 158
nominal capture (bottom). The inset on the top panel shows an
amplified view of two sudden amplitude fades in the received
false signal. The maximum carrier-to-noise ratio C/N0 over
the intervals shown are, from the top, 42.5, 46.8, and 52.5
dB-Hz.
error of approximately 6 × 10−10, which is consistent with
an OCXO. Thus, given the results of Table I, treating δt˙T
as constant over each 60-second capture can be expected
to introduce 95% errors smaller than 71 meters in single-
pass geolocation. A Monte-Carlo simulation like the one that
produced the Table I data but for the combined three days of
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Fig. 7: Top: Doppler time history corresponding to the false
PRN 10 signal from the day 144 capture. Bottom: Post-fit
residuals of the Doppler time history assuming the estimated
transmitter location and clock rate offset. The standard devia-
tion of the post-fit residuals is 2.3 Hz.
Fig. 8: Estimated transmitter location overlaid on formal-
error 95% and 99% horizontal error ellipses. The location is
coincident with an airbase on the coast of Syria.
collection showed that, assuming independence in the clock
frequency errors between passes, this error source reduces to
24 meters (95%) in the combined 3-day solution.
Fig. 7 shows time histories of Doppler and post-fit residuals
for false PRN 10 collected on day 144. The standard deviation
of the post-fit residuals is 2.3 Hz, indicating that the underlying
model is quite accurate but does include error sources other
than thermal noise. Fig. 8 shows the estimated position of
the interference source, whose location coincides with an
airbase in Syria. The horizontal error ellipses, which indicate a
solution better than 220 meters (95%), are formal error ellipses
assuming (1) constant δt˙T over each capture, (2) a standard
deviation of 5 m for the transmitter altitude constraint, and
(3) a standard deviation between 2.3 and 2.5 Hz (depending
on the empirical post-fit residuals for each capture) for the
measurement error w from (7). Assuming an OCXO-quality
clock in the transmitter, the error caused by modeling a
constant δt˙T is small compared to these formal error ellipses.
E. Transmitter EIRP
By analyzing the authentic signal CINR values in the
captured data one can infer the EIRP of the emitter located in
Syria. The average decrease in CINR observed at the ISS when
1340 km from the source was approximately 6 dB. Assume the
interference acts as multi-access interference, whose spectral
density is I0 = (2/3)PITC [16], where PI is the received
interference power and TC = 1023−1 ms is the GPS L1 C/A
spreading code chip interval. Then, assuming N0 = −204
dBW/Hz, a drop in CINR by 6 dB implies PI = −137.4
dBW. Referring to (6), assume L = 159 dB, consistent with a
stand-off distance of 1340 km, and Gr = 3 dB. It follows that
the EIRP of the interference source is PEIRP = 18.6 dBW,
which implies a 72-W transmitter.
IV. GLOBAL INTERFERENCE SURVEY VIA
RECEIVER-REPORTED CINR
The raw IF data captures from the ISS FOTON receiver
enable detailed monitoring of GNSS interference signals and
their structure, but such captures are infrequent and limited to
short 1-minute intervals. By contrast, the 1-Hz standard GNSS
observables and 100-Hz data-wiped complex correlation prod-
ucts have been logged nearly continuously since early 2017.
These data facilitate a world-wide survey of strong GNSS
interference.
The carrier power C of an authentic signal can be modeled
as a function C(j, f, rsr, zs, zr), where j is the GNSS satellite
identifier (SV ID), f is the frequency band (L1 or L2), rsr
is the range between the GNSS satellite antenna and the
ISS FOTON antenna, zs is the angle between the satellite
boresight direction and the direction to the ISS antenna (i.e.,
the satellite antenna zenith angle), and zr is the angle between
the ISS antenna boresight direction and the direction to the
satellite (the receiver antenna zenith angle). As discussed in
Section II-A1, a hypothesis test based on the receiver-reported
CINR can be designed to detect whether (H1) or not (H0) the
receiver is experiencing interference. Under a given PF, this
requires that the statistics E[l|H0] and Var(l|H0) be known.
To obtain these statistics, this section assumes the receiver
reports interference-free data (consistent with H0) when the
ISS is over deep ocean bodies.
To isolate the variations in reported CINR due to in-
terference, the data are first pre-processed to eliminate the
predictable sources of carrier power variation. First, the de-
pendence of C on rsr is removed by compensating for the
free space path loss:
Cˆ(j, f, zs, zr) = C(j, f, rsr, zs, zr)×
(
4pirsrf
c
)2
Modeling of interference-free C/N0 is complicated by the
ISS’s local multipath environment. The ISS antenna is flanked
by solar panels that move with respect to the FOTON antenna,
9Fig. 9: For receiver zenith angle zr ≤ 15◦ (within the gray
region), the satellite zenith angle zs is restricted between
14.2◦ ≤ zs ≤ 15.2◦
causing a non-stationary signal obstruction and multipath en-
vironment. Nevertheless, a zenith angle window zr ∈ [0◦, 15◦]
is known to be free of obstructions. Only the signals received
in this window are considered for interference detection in
this paper’s analysis. Confining zr to this window restricts
the geometry between GNSS satellites and the ISS such that
zs ∈ [14.2◦, 15.2◦] (see Fig. 9). The GNSS antenna gain
pattern can be assumed to be relatively constant over ±0.5◦.
Thus, Cˆ(j, f, zs, zr) can be assumed independent of zs.
The mean and variance of ISS-reported range-compensated-
CINR values Cˆ/N0 collected over deep ocean regions are
maintained as control data in a three-dimensional grid of SV
ID j, frequency band f , and receiver zenith angle zr. For a
world-wide analysis of GNSS interference events, a hypothesis
test is performed on the test statistic derived from Cˆ/N0
values that fall within zr ∈ [0◦, 15◦]. The test is performed
separately for the L1 and L2 bands since the interference
characteristics are frequency dependent. If the reported test
statistics falls below E[l|H0] − 3
√
Var(l|H0), the receiver is
declared to be under interference. This threshold respects a PF
of approximately 1.35× 10−3.
Fig. 10 shows the ratio of the number of potential inter-
ference events recorded at L1 (top panel) and L2 (bottom
panel) to total number of hypothesis tests performed at each
location for the foregoing detection threshold. As expected, a
high ratio of potential interference events is reported for both
L1 and L2 near Syria (marked with a red dot). Note that the
interference “hotspot” appears to the east of the source because
the ISS orbit is prograde and the FOTON antenna points in the
anti-velocity direction. In other words, the FOTON antenna is
exposed to interference only after the ISS passes eastward over
an emitter’s location.
The high values of the statistic for both L1 and L2 east
of Syria indicate that the interference activity in Syria has
been persistent over nearly the full interval considered in this
paper, from March 2017 to June 2020. A monthly analysis
(not shown) revealed that the source has been transmitting at
L2 since at latest March 2017. It began transmitting weak
interference at L1 during the second half of 2017, then much
stronger interference at L1 during the first quarter of 2018.
The interference at L1 and L2 was ongoing in June 2020.
A weaker hotspot is present to the west of the Syrian
interference. This hotspot, which emerged in the second half
of 2019, is consistent with reports of GNSS interference in
the Libyan region [37]. The magenta dots in Fig. 10 denote
the approximate location of the area in which interference has
been documented (33◦ N, 14◦ E). Fig. 10 also reveals strong
L2 interference over mainland China. This interference has
been present since at latest March 2017 and was ongoing in
June 2020. The green dot in Fig. 10, marked at (32◦ N, 114◦
E), indicates a hypothesized interference source location based
on the shape and location of the observed hotspot.
Note that the above method of counting potential interfer-
ence events based on CINR degradation ignores cases where
interference might lead to complete loss of track of some or
all GPS signals. However, the data from the ISS shows that
FOTON does not lose track of authentic GNSS signals even
when flying by the strong interference source in Syria. In
fact, the reported CINR over Syria is well above the weakest
signal that FOTON is capable of tracking. As a result, it was
concluded that in cases where FOTON seems to track few or
no GPS signals, it is likely due to some abnormal behavior of
the receiver, and not due to a potential interference event.
In addition to the global average analysis summarized in
Fig. 10, it is instructive to examine the time history of receiver
reported CINR as the ISS passes over an interference hotspot.
Fig. 11 shows two such histories for signals within the admis-
sible range of zr as the ISS goes over the strong interference
regions in Syria (Fig. 11(a)) and China (Fig. 11(b)). Green and
blue data points represent range-compensated CINR values
for authentic L1 and L2 GNSS signals, respectively, above
the applicable threshold, which depends on i, f , and zr.
Light red data points are the same data when below the
applicable threshold. Both L1 and L2 signals are declared
under interference in Fig. 11(a), whereas only L2 signals are
declared under interference in Fig. 11(b). The brief dip in
Fig. 11(b) prior to the major dip over China is caused by the
Syrian interference. Gaps in the time histories indicate periods
with no tracked signals in the admissible zenith angle window.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR GNSS RECEIVERS
The matched-code interference captured over Syria is in-
triguing. So far as this paper’s authors are aware, no other
GNSS interference captured from an operational (as opposed
to experimental) source has exhibited the characteristics ob-
served in the Syrian interference. If the intent behind the
signals transmitted at L1 is not spoofing but rather denial of
GPS service, as can be inferred from the lack of navigation
data bit modulation, then why bother transmitting an ensemble
of signals, each one modulated by a separate GPS L1 C/A
spreading code? For purposes of maximizing the interference
noise power density I0 in a receiver configured to track GPS
L1 C/A signals, the transmitter would do just as well by
allocating all its power to a single GPS L1 C/A spreading code,
or any code with a similar spectral density [16]. What motive
can be surmised for the additional complication of transmitting
a multitude of spreading codes?
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Fig. 10: Ratio of number of potential GPS L1 (top panel) and L2 (bottom panel) interference events recorded to total number
of hypothesis tests performed at each location on the map for the full span of data considered in this paper, from March 2017
to June 2020. The red dots indicate the estimated origin of the Syrian interference based on raw IF recordings. Another hotspot
of interference is apparent to the west of the Syrian interference. The magenta dots denote the approximate location of GNSS
interference reports in the Libyan region [37]. In addition to the interference over the Syrian and Libyan regions, strong L2
interference over mainland China is observed. The green dot at (32◦ N, 114◦ E) indicates a hypothesized interference source
location based on the shape and location of the observed hotspot.
Fig. 11: Time histories of range-compensated receiver-reported
CINR as the ISS flies over potential GPS interference zones
over Syria and China.
The answer appears to be that the Syrian interferer is
designed not only to maximize I0 but also to efficiently disrupt
cold-start acquisition of GPS L1 C/A signals, as explained
below.
A. Efficient Jamming
The art of jamming is more sophisticated than merely
dumping RF energy into a band of interest. An efficient
jammer is one that effectively disrupts GNSS service in a
given area of operations but does so with as little power as
possible. Such frugality extends the life of battery-powered
jammers, and makes all jammers less conspicuous. The key
to efficient jamming is avoiding wasteful allocation of signal
power. Obviously, allocating power outside a target receiver’s
passband is wasteful because the interference is filtered out
by the receiver’s RF front-end. Less obviously, narrowband
jamming applied directly in the passband is also wasteful. To
understand this, consider the vector space of all possible input
signals, and a partitioning into a subspace that contains the
jamming signal and one that does not. If the jammer-occupied
subspace is sparse with respect to the desired signal subspace,
and if the receiver’s front-end amplification and quantization
are not saturated, then a technique can be developed to excise
the jammer-occupied subspace with minimal degradation to
the desired signals. For a narrowband jammer, the technique
is notch filtering; for a pulsed jammer, the technique is pulse
blanking [16].
An efficient jammer maximizes overlap with the desired-
signal subspace for a given power allocation. Jamming that
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is continuous in the time domain and white (spectrally flat)
within the desired signal passband in the frequency domain is
fairly efficient because it extensively overlaps the desired sig-
nal subspace. But continuous-time matched-spectrum jamming
is even more efficient: Instead of spreading the jamming power
evenly across the passband, a matched-spectrum jammer
shapes it for greater overlap with the desired signal subspace.
Consider a random binary spreading code with chip interval
TC. Suppose a spectrally-flat jammer is designed to cover
the spreading code’s primary spectral lobe and first two side
lobes, for a total frequency span of 4/TC Hz. The noise power
density that passes through the receiver’s matched filter is
I0 = PITC/4, where PI is the interference power. By contrast,
for a matched-spectrum jammer I0 = (2/3)PITC [16]. When
I0 is large enough that CINR ≈ C/I0, the matched-spectrum
jammer is 4.3 dB more potent than the spectrally-flat jammer.
What is more, the spectrally-flat jammer spanning 4/TC Hz
can be excised by filtering in the frequency domain: even if the
main lobe and adjacent two side lobes of the authentic signals
are removed along with the jamming, the authentic signals
are only attenuated by 13 dB. The spectrally-flat jammer must
spread its power even wider to avoid such excision by filtering,
resulting in an even less favorable potency compared with
matched-spectrum jamming. By contrast, a matched-spectrum
jammer cannot be excised by filtering because its spectrum
follows the sinc2(fTC) envelope of the authentic binary-code-
modulated signals. By generalizing this argument, one can
prove that spectrum matching is a necessary condition for
efficient jamming.
However, spectrum matching is not a sufficient condition.
Consider a jammer emitting a carrier modulated only by a
single publicly-known spreading code of arbitrary length. This
signal is sparse with respect to the desired signal subspace.
It can be excised by the receiver generating a local replica
of the interference signal, aligning this replica’s code phase,
carrier phase, and amplitude with the interference signal,
and subtracting the replica from the digitized output of the
receiver’s RF front end. Assuming sufficient front-end bit
depth and amplifier linearity, this procedure can be extended
to an arbitrary number of such interference signals, each with
a known waveform; the technique is known as successive
interference cancellation (SIC) [38].
Thus, an effective jammer will not be designed to emit
predictable signals; a safer approach to spectrum matching
is modulation of the carrier with a non-repeating spectrum-
matching spreading code known only to the jammer. But this
is only true when the target receiver is capable of SIC. If, for
example, the receiver has no way of distinguishing authentic
from interference signals, then it cannot apply SIC without
also eliminating desired signals.
B. Targeting Cold Start
Under what conditions is a receiver unable to distinguish
between authentic and interference signals? When (1) the
authentic and interference signals are identical in all aspects
of significance (modulation, code phase, carrier phase and
frequency, amplitude), or (2) the authentic and interference
signals are identical except in ways the target receiver is unable
to exploit to distinguish them. In case (1), the interference is
hardly a problem: it simply reinforces the authentic signals.
Case (2) is more interesting. Let the term spoofing interference
refer to matched-code interference with all additional mod-
ulation requisite to make the interference signal’s structure
and content identical to an authentic signal’s. If a receiver
is exposed to spoofing interference while already tracking
enough authentic signals to form a navigation solution and
when in possession of accurate satellite ephemerides, it can
distinguish any authentic and interference signals that differ
in code phase, carrier frequency, or amplitude. (It can ad-
ditionally distinguish by carrier phase if performing precise
carrier-based navigation.) Therefore, jamming a navigation-
locked receiver with spoofing interference may be ineffective
because the target receiver can apply SIC.
However, during a cold start, the target receiver’s time and
position are uncertain, and it lacks the ephemerides necessary
to predict the code phase and Doppler of authentic signals
even if its time and position were known. In this case the
receiver is highly vulnerable to spoofing interference. Suppose
a jammer generates a counterpart power-matched spoofing
signal for each authentic GNSS signal available in an area
of operations. Suppose further that the ensemble of spoofing
signals is self-consistent with a location and time different
from the target receiver’s true location and time. On cold start,
the receiver is jammed not in the traditional sense of being
unable to acquire and track the authentic signals, but rather
in the sense of being unable to confidently declare which of
two plausible-looking navigation solutions is correct. If, under
this circumstance, the receiver refuses to provide a navigation
solution, the user is effectively denied GNSS service. If instead
the receiver mistakenly provides the spoofed solution, the user
could be exposed to hazardously misleading information.
Note that this type of spoofing interference is extremely
efficient. Suppose the target receiver has a cold-start CINR
acquisition threshold of η dB-Hz. Then traditional matched-
spectrum jamming would require a jamming-to-authentic
power ratio equal to
PI
C
= −
[
η + 10 log10
(
2TC
3
)]
(9)
which, for GPS L1 C/A signals and a typical η = 30 dB-
Hz, amounts to 31.8 dB. By contrast, jamming via single-
counterpart power-matched spoofing interference requires only
PI/C = 0 dB, which makes it more than 1500 times more
efficient for denial of GNSS service at cold start.
C. Discussion
The interference captured over Syria appears to be de-
signed to achieve traditional matched-spectrum jamming at
close range, and to disrupt cold-start acquisition far beyond
this (along its line-of-sight). Indeed, it would be at least
partially effective at preventing FOTON cold start even at
the maximum line-of-sight range to the ISS, or approximately
1600 km. However, the interference signals as broadcast have
at least four flaws, any one of which could be exploited by
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receivers to distinguish them from authentic signals: (1) they
lack navigation data modulation; (2) they are broadcast on
a (nearly) common and constant carrier frequency; (3) they
share a common code phase alignment; (4) they include signals
for (almost) all GPS PRNs. A receiver built to detect these
anomalies could identify the imposter signals and eliminate
them via SIC.
However, proper spoofing interference is not so easily
distinguished from authentic signals, and is both effective and
extremely power-efficient at denying GNSS service on cold
start. The best defense against spoofing interference intended
to deny GNSS service remains an open problem.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Low-earth-orbiting instruments capable of receiving signals
in GNSS bands are a powerful tool for characterizing GNSS
interference emanating from terrestrial sources. Data from one
such instrument, the FOTON software-defined GNSS receiver,
which has been operational on the International Space Station
since February 2017, reveal interesting patterns of GNSS
interference from March 2017 to June 2020. A particularly
powerful and persistent interference source active in Syria
since 2017 was found to generate 72-W (EIRP) transmissions
at the GPS L1 frequency containing signals modulated by all
32 GPS L1 C/A spreading codes, but with no data modulation,
indicating that the signals’ purpose is denial of GNSS service.
A global analysis revealed other interference hotspots around
the globe in both the GPS L1 and L2 frequency bands. It was
argued that matched-spectrum interference is most efficient
for jamming signal-locked GNSS receivers, while matched-
code and especially spoofing interference are extremely power-
efficient for jamming GNSS receivers during cold start.
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